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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

JOSEPH DELBERT MARRIOTT
and HELEN H. MARRIOTT, his
wife; M. STEWART MARRIOTT
and LAURA MARRIOTT, his wife;
CALEB :MARRIOTT, a single
man; GILBERT ENOS MARRIOTT and HELEN A. F. MARRIOTT, his wife; and ETHEL
TRACY, a woman,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
11088

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a highway condemnation action brought
by plaintiff to acquire lands of the defendants in Ogden
City, Weber County, for the Interstate Freeway Proj-
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ect, wherein the sole issue before the lower court related
to determining the value of an .83 acre tract of land
being acquired for highway purposes.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The value issue was tried by a jury, and a verdict
was returned setting the value of the land acquired at
$7 ,500.00, which was the exact amount testified to by
the plaintiff's expert witness as being its value.
Defendants filed a Motion For New Trial (R. 46),
based upon several errors which they contended were
committed by the Court and opposing counsel. The
Motion For New Trial was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of the Judgment on
Verdict entered in this matter and of the Order denying
their motion for a new trial, and request that the matter
be returned to the Second Judicial District Court in
and for Weber County for a new trial on the sole issue
of damages to be awarded for the tract of unimproved
land taken in these proceedings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 21, 1965, plaintiff filed a Complaint
against defendants to acquire from them a triangular
shaped tract of unimproved land on the west boundary
2

of Ogden City, at the intersection of Pennsylvania
Avenue and 26th Street (Tr. 38, 52), for purposes
incidental to construction of Interstate Freeway I-15,
which ran northwesterly through the general area (Tr.
-1!3). The freeway construction contemplated a built-up
earthen fill of 25 feet as it crossed over Pennsylvania
Avenue and the contiguous railroad spur track.
The tract of land involved consisted of .83 net
acre (Tr. 46-67-and see the large Trial Map: Exh.
A) . The land was bordered on its .south side by 26th
Street and along the northerly side by Pennsylvania
Avenue (which was in a northeasterly-southwesterly
angle to the property). The west tip of the subject
tract was in a five-point highway intersection area
where five converging roads came together (Tr. 52, 67) .
The property was zoned M-2 at the time (Tr. 48,
69) , and was served by all necessary utilities, including
sewer (Tr. 110).
Each litigant produced one expert witness for the
purpose of establishing value. The witness for defendants, Harold Welch, testified that the highest and best
use of the subject property at the time of taking was
for a commercial service station site furnishing gas
and other services to motorists (Tr. 48, 57), and valued
the land at $35,000.00; plaintiff's witness, Gregory
Austin, testified that the highest and best use of the
property was that adaptable to a light industrial site
(Tr. 113), and valued it at $7,500.00.
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The jury verdict awarded defendants $7,500.00
for the property.
Defendants contend that, because of errors and
abuse of discretion committed by the trial judge, together with improper argument made by opposing
counsel in his summation to the jury, they were denied
a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed them under
the laws and Constitution of Utah and the United
States. Because defendants contend that the prejudicial actions denying them a fair trial commenced with
the empanelling of the jury, and continued to the mo·
ment the jury retired to deliberate, further facts will
be stated in the chronology of points contained in the
following argument.
ARGUMENT

I.
A JUROR'S PERSONAL FEELINGS CON·
CERNING THE LAW OR WHAT IT SHOULD
BE IS NOT A PROPER SUBJECT OF IN·
QUIRY ON VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION.

At the commencement of trial, after the Clerk had
drawn the names of the 14 jurors to be examined, the
trial judge generally informed the jury as to the nature
of the case, that the Constitution and laws of Utah
provide that a landowner should be paid compensation
if his lands are taken for public projects, and that the
law of eminent domain allowed the government to take
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properties from a landowner without his consent for
highway purposes because, otherwise, one might find
" ... somebody in the middle of a highway that wanted
a million dollars . . . " (Tr. 18) . The Court further
went on to point out that for the lands actually taken
a landowner should be paid fair market value, that the
state legislature " ... expanded on it just a little ...
to provide for severance damages ... ," and that, if the
public project benefitted the remaining lands of the
owner, offsetting benefits should be deducted from
severance damages since " ... they don't want to give
away the public money that way, ... " (Tr. 19).
After generally stating the law, the trial judge
then asked each prospective juror to stand up and state
his thinking as to " ... how you happen to feel about
this law" ( Tr. 19) . Each juror was also asked " . . .
if you had been a legislator (whether) you might have
been more generous or less generous about it."
The general comments as to what the law was, as
explained by the trial judge, may not have had a prejudicial effect upon the jurors if the matter had simply
been dropped without getting into a discussion with
the various jurors. However, it soon became evident
that the case was starting off with a very subtle advantage in favor of the State Road Commission, as comments from the prospective jurors started coming forth:
" ... As a taxpayer I don't think any excessive payments or grants should be made to the
property owner. Taxes are high enough now."
(Tr. 20)
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"I think it is a very good law. It would be
pretty hard to have growth without it."
"I think we all have to give way to progress
and sometimes the individual who is giving awav
to progress doesn't always benefit as he feels h.e
should, but we have to regulate all of those things
by law." (Tr. 22)
The thinking of the remaining prospective jurors
generally fell in line with the comments made by the
first two or three, and eventually the interrogation
turned to other subjects.
Defendants submit that the explanation given to
the prospective jurors, both before interrogating them
and as they were being interrogated, is a more proper
subject to be included in Instructions at the end of the
trial, and should not be the subject of extensive inter·
rogation during their selection. In addition to setting
the stage for a trial favorable to the condemnor, there
is another objection that does not readily appear. For
instance, if any juror on the panel had feelings differ·
ent from what the law was, it is very obvious that those
feelings would almost have to be in the direction of
being more favorable to the property owner losing
his land. Accordingly, while in many cases the interro·
gation of the type conducted by the Court in this in·
stance might not be harmful, the only conclusion which
can be drawn from an interrogation of this type is that
it serves no purpose beneficial to a property owner,
that it places the condemning agency in a favorable
light and, at the same time, serves as an effective tool
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for "smoking out" any juror who might have feelings
farnrable to the property owner. Thus, the procedure
here followed simply the purposes of the plaintiff.

In the case of State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293,
3(i5 P. 2d 798 ( 1961), the Utah Supreme Court had
before it on appeal a case which posed a similar question
and which was appealed from the same source as the
case at bar. In that case the trial judge gave quizzes
to prospective jurors to determine their qualifications
to become members of a jury panel. In commenting
upon such method of selecting jurors this Court said on
page 799:
"There is no statutory provision for the giving
of tests by a court to qualify persons called for
jury duty. The court erred in restricting the
jury panel to those who it thus determined were
qualified. The procurement of a panel by this
method could tend to deny a party a fair cross
section of citizens of the county in which the trial
is being held . . . "
This Court in that case went on to mitigate its
stand against such quizzes by stating that the questions
might have been intended to determine the qualification
of prospective jurors under Sections 78-46-8 and 7846-9, U. C. A., 1953.
In the instant case there can be no doubt that the
trial judge's searching questions did not go to the fitness
or competency of prospective jurors. The questions
had no relationship to statutory qualifications. Instead,
the questions went to the matter of general bias towards
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the law of the State of Utah. Specifically, the questions
were directed to ferret out only those persons against
whom the state as condemnor would most likely use its
peremptory challenges.
This type of conduct, where a trial judge has contributed to the selection of jurors by ferreting out thost
other than prospective jurors lacking statutory qualifications, has been condemned by this Court in the
case of State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead.
82 Utah 416, 25 P. 2d 612 (1933). In that case this
Court held it to be an abuse of discretion for a judge
to challenge for cause (bias) on his own motion. Af·
firmatively stated, a judge can only dismiss a juror on
his own motion when the juror lacks the statutory
qualifications. If a judge cannot ferret out for cause
challenges then, a fortiori, he should not be allowed to
search out peremptory challenges.
Undoubtedly, the trial judge has considerable
latitude in ascertaining the fitness and competency of
jurors to sit in a cause. As much is clear from Rule 47
(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and from
the case of State v. Gregorious, 81 Utah 33, 16 P. 2d
893 (1933).
Nevertheless, the Gregarious case contains a caveat
against questioning by the judge as to the views of the
prospective jurors. On page 894 this Court made clear
the fact that a difference exists betwen admonishing
jurors on points of law and between ascertaining state
of mind concerning the law.
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" ... Further, we do not see anything objectionable to the questions propounded unless it
be the last two questions, because they were more
in the nature of admonitions to the jurors than
of ascertaining state of mind." (emphasis added).
The law has been more specifically stated in the
New Mexico criminal case of State v. Thompson, 68
N.M. 219, 360 P. 2d 637, 639 (1961), where the Supreme Court of that state upheld a trial judge in
refusing to permit appellant to interrogate prospective
jurors on voir dire as to their attitude and frame of
mind as to the law:
"A juror's personal view as to the law or what
it should be is not a proper subject of inquiry
on voir dire examination; he is bound by the law
received from the court." (citing authority)
Consequently, the trial judge in this case committed prejudicial error by interrogating prospective
jurors as to their feelings and attitude toward the law
of condemnation as applied in the State of Utah. Such
is apparent by a comparison of the quoted portions of
the Gregarious and Thompson cases with the language
of the district judge where he asked (Tr. 18) :
"Third, I would like you to tell me generally,
how you feel about this particular Jaw of condemnation."
If this Court believes that the method followed by
the trial judge in this case is proper, then it might
ponder the interrogation of the prospective jurors by
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the trial judge, or counsel, as to their feelings concerning the following question:
"Members of the jury, the law of eminent domain does not permit a landowner in a condem.
nation case to recover for the following expense.1
which he must necessarily incur:
(1) Attorney's fees;
(2) Appraiser's fees, except to the extent of

recovering $6.00 per day while the ap·
praiser appears in Court (plus 20c per
mile one way from the appraiser's resi·
dence to the place of trial; and

( 3) Business and similar losses not directly
related to the value associated with his
real property holdings.

I want each of you to express your thoughts
as to whether you believe the landowner should
or should not be entitled to recover any or all
of the foregoing expenses in an action of this
. d"
k Ill
.
In a subsequent condemnation case, where the same
procedure of interrogating the jurors had been followed
as was done in this case, the trial judge in this case
refused to interrogate the prospective jurors concerning
their thinking as to the foregoing matters, and would
not permit counsel for the landowners to do so. It is
submitted that no real distinction can be drawn which,
once the door is opened, does not give both sides a fair
exposure to a prospective juror's inner thinking.
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II.
PERMITTING THE JURY TO VIEW THE
PREMISES, WHICH HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY OBLITERATED AND ALTERED,
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 'VHICH
WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANTS'
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
During the trial plaintiff requested that the jury
be permitted to view the premises. Defendants registered immediate objection to the request (Tr. 190)
inasmuch as the entire area involved was greatly altered
in appearance by reason of the large mounds of earth
placed in the involved area and, worse still - since
defendants' premise supporting their value claim was
that the subject property being condemned had value
as a service station site-every indication of the fivepointed street intersection on which the property originally faced was completely obliterated and destroyed.
Rule 47 (j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
gives the trial judge discretion as to whether a jury
view of the property which is the subject of litigation
or of the place in which any material fact occurred
should be permitted. No special rule or statute applies
to the field of eminent domain as in some states-the
one cited Rules applies in all civil cases.
In exercising this discretion the trial court should
look to the utility in serving the judicial purpose as this
Court did in the case of Stevens v. Memmott, 9 Utah
2d 37, 337 P. 2d 418 (1959). In the Stevens case this

11

Court was concerned with the ascertainment of clarity
and with the effect of the jury view upon that quest
On page 420 this Court briefly stated the general
guidelines to be followed by the lower courts:
"We feel also that the court did not err in re.
fusing to permit the jury to take a view of the
disputed claims, since the evidence indicated that
such a view would have led as much or more to
confusion as it would to clarity."
Furthermore, this Court has indicated generally
what facts give rise to the confusion mentioned in the
Stevens case. In Balle v. Smith, 81Utah179, 17 P. 2d
224 ( 1932) , the discretion of the trial judge, in refusing
to permit a view of a model T Ford coupe loaded with
five persons to resemble circumstances which existed
at the time of the accident, was upheld on the ground
that time had wrought changes which would confuse
the jurors. This Court emphasized that about fifteen
months had elapsed between the time of the accident
and the day of the trial, during which time the boys
and girls had increased in weight and size.
The rule as it applies to eminent domain cases is
well stated by Judge Inch in the case of United State,1
v. 4,475.23 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Towns of
Riverhead and Brookhaven, County of Suffolk, State
of New York, 151 F. Supp, 590, 591 (D. C. N. Y
1957), Affirmed, 254 F. 2d 686 (2nd Cir. 1958):
"While a view of the property by the Cour~,
jury or commission is not now required, it is
considered advisable, where possible, and when
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the physical characteristics of the land and improv~men~s have not so changed since the taking
as to impair the value of personal inspection ... "
The precise issue involved in this case arose in the

case of Ajootian v. Director of Public W arks, 90 R.I.
96, 155 A. 2d 244 ( 1959) . That case involved the taking

of a 2V2 story wooden frame dwelling for

freeway
purposes. On appeal the landowner had alleged error
in allowing a view of the premises. Directing its attention to the proper procedure which a trial judge should
use in exercising his discretion regarding a view of
the premises, the Rhode Island Supreme Court quoted
on page 246 from its prior opinion in the case of State
v. Smith, 70 R. I. 500, 41 A. 2d 153, 157:
"But when an objection on grounds other than
those purely legal is made to a motion that a
view be taken, the trial justice should not pass
upon the motion pro forma. He should require
sufficient information respecting its merits so
that he may intelligently exercise his discretion
in deciding whether it was reasonably necessary
for the better understanding of the evidence for
the expedition of the trial and in protecting the
rights of all interested parties. The burden of
satisfying him that the taking of the view at
such time is reasonably necessary under all the
circumstances is upon the moving party in this
instance, the state."
The Rhode Island Supreme Court continued by
holding in regard to the sole issue upon appeal that the
trial judge had abused his discretion in allowing a view
of the condemned premises. In the words of that court
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"
( t) he effect of the view ... allowed the jury to
see the property long after it was taken by the State
and after the condition of the premises had materially
changed for the worse." In conclusion the court spok~
thusly, on page 247:
"We are of the opinion that the customary
purpose for which a view is ordinarily allowed
was not shown in this case. In the circumstances
previously outlined, the trial justice's action was
clearly an abuse of discretion which was prejudicial to the petitioners' right to a fair hearing

.

The Ajootian case is not the only case to be found
which has faced the issue at hand. Other reported cases
are to be found which point out the importance of the
facts and the law involved in each appeal.
By way of example, in the case of Oregon-Wash·
ington R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 34 Idaho 601, 202
Pac. 1065 ( 1921), an objection was raised to the view
on the grounds of material alteration because of the
construction of the railroad prior to trial. The appellate
court held that there had been no abuse of discretion.
A look at the facts points out that no alteration of the
premises existed to the degree that it would confuse
the jurors or create an injustice by precluding the jurors
from visualizing the property as it existed at the time
of the taking. The facts show that the railroad merely
condemned a right-of-way through a large tract of 120
acres.
In contradistinction to the case last cited, the case

14

at bar poses a situation where major alterations had
occurred prior to trial. The original tract contained
0.83 acre which was not subjected to a public easement
(Tr. 39), and from that acreage there was actually
used in construction 0.59 acre (Tr. 41). At the time
of trial, construction activities on the taken property
had been in progress for nearly two years (Tr. 39~
and a six foot chain link fence which divided the taking
from the remainder had been erected (Tr. 42). Approximately 25 feet of fill had been placed adjacent to
the property (Tr. 43) and one of the two streets abutting the subject premises, 26th Street, had been ended
or made into a cul-de-sac at a point east of the subject
property and at a point which denied the subject property any access to 26th Street.
The alterations above mentioned are of particular
significance when it is considered that the highest and
best use of the subject property, as testified to by the
landowner's expert witness (Tr. 66), was for a service
station or other type of automotive service site. As
admitted by the state's appraiser (Tr. 139), accessibility and view are important characteristics in selecting
a service station site. Both of these characteristics had
been severely impaired by construction activities. Of
particular importance is the change in appearance
created by the obliteration of 26th Street at its confluence with Pennsylvania Avenue, at which confluence
or intersection the subject property was located.
The state of the statutory law concerning Jury
views is also reflected in the written case law. The
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statutes or rules of many states give an absolute right
to a jury view. This absolute right is claimed by a mere
request for a jury view by one party. These statute~
are particularly likely to be found as special legislation
dealing with eminent domain. Cases where a jury view
has been required by statute under circumstances where
the appellant claimed a change in the conditions of the
premises include the cases of South Park Com'rs v.
Livingston, 344 Ill. 368, 176 N .E. 546 ( 1931), and
City of Akron v. Alexander, 5 Ohio St. 2d 75, 214 N.E.
2d 89 ( 1966). It is interesting to note what the Ohio
Supreme Court said about the jury view in eminent
domain cases even though the interpretation of a
mandatory statue was involved. In upholding the trial
judge who had refused to allow a jury view the court
said on page 91 :
"The purpose of the statute, in light of the
previously stated rules of law, is to provide for
just compensation to a property owner and t~
provide. the jury with assistance when the ev1·
dence is complex or unclear. In a case where the
view would cause an injustice to the property
owner and deprive him of compensation to which
he is entitled, and where the evidence of valua·
tion is not alleged to be complex or unclear, the
legislative purpose would not be served in grant·
ing a view of the premises."
Another Illinois case, but one which was not con·
cerned with a mandatory statute, is the case of City of
Chicago v. Koff, 341 Ill. 520, 173 N.E. 666 (1930).
That case is directly in point and represents a decision
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where the trial judge was overruled for abuse of discretion in allowing a jury view of condemned premises
which had materially deteriorated. The taking involved
the west seventeen feet of a tract with a four story brick
building. The taking was sufficient to destroy the
existing structure, making the lot suitable for only a
small building. In the interim between the taking and
trial the building had been vacated and had deteriorated
through nonuse and possibly vandalism. In determining
whether the trial court had abused its discretion the
Illinois Supreme Court discussed the danger in allowing a jury view of condemned properties which had
physically changed. The reasoning behind the court's
decision to reverse the trial court is given on page 668:
"It was a matter within the discretion of the
trial court to permit or deny a view of the premises, subject to review for abuse of that discretion. Was it an abuse of discretion to permit the
jury to view the premises in this case?

* * •

"Much valid objection may be seen to a view
by the jury in a case of this character. There is
no method by which there may be preserved in
a bill of exceptions the evidence of the manner
in or extent to which the minds of the various
members of the jury were impressed by a view
of a building, and where, as here, such changes
have taken place as to render a view of no assistance to the jury, for the reason that the condition
at the time of the trial does not reflect the value
as of the time the petition was filed, it is an abuse
of discretion to permit such view. It will be
conceded that a photograph which does not
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present a true picture of an object as of the
time to which the evidence concerning it relies
is not admissible in evidence except it be with
a full explanation of the changes, and we are
of the opinion that in this case the building
showed such deterioration that a view of the
premises ~hould not have been permitted. Such
view could scarcely have been said to be of any
assistance to the jury in understanding the evidence offered concerning the property."
The rea.soning of the Koff case is echoed in the
case of City of Cleveland v. Carcione, ll8 Ohio App.
525, 190 N.E. 2d 52, 5 A. L. R. 2d 52 (1963), where
the trial court was declared to have abused its discretion
in allowing a jury view of condemned property which
had deteriorated subsequent to the resolution of taking.
The appellate court reasoned that no useful purpose
was served in permitting the jury view and that in the
state of the record to do so was prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant. ,

III
PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED
IN PERMITTING AN UNQUALIFIED WITNESS TO GIVE EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY.
As part of plaintiff's case it offered George M.
Jay as an expert witness for the purpose of giving
testimony concerning the subject property as not being
a good service station site (Tr. 95). His qualifications
consisted of being the area sales representative for
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Standard Oil Company of California (Tr. 91), primarily involved in selling merchandise to the various
Chevron stations. Over objections of defendants' counsel, Mr.Jay was permitted to testify that, in his personal
opinion, the subject property " . . . would (not) make
a good service station site." (Tr. 95)
·
There is no doubt that the law in Utah leaves the
matter within the sound discretion of the trial court,
as stated in the condemnation case of Weber Basin
1Vater District v. Nel,son, 358 P. 2d 81, 11Utah2~ 253
(1960), where this Court said:
"The matter of proper foundation or qualifi- .
cation of a witness to state an opinion, where
the same is permissible in evidence, lies largely
within the sound discretion of the trial court.
The determination of the trial court will not be
disturbed except in extreme cases where it is
manifest
that the
trial court
abused .its discre. "
.
.
tion.
.

In making their objections to Mr. Jay's testimony,
defendants objected to the foundation and ba'ckground
of the witness on two separate points:
( 1) The witness was unfamiliar with the subject
property.

A. Now in your opinion, what kind of service
station site would this subject property that
is showed in pink?
· ·

MR. FULLER:

We object. There is absolutely no foundation
to show the familiarity of this witness to this
site.
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THE COURT:

Do you know where we are talking about?

A. I think it is a little piece that is fenced off,
is it not, your honor? I am not familiar with
the footage.
Q. Are you familiar with the intersection of
26th and Pennsylvania Avenue prior to the
construction of the freeway in that area?

A. Yes, but I never paid much attention to it,
to tell you the truth.
(Tr. 94)
(2) The witness had insufficient qualification to

serve as f oundatiorn for the giving of an opinion concerning the subject property as a service station site.
Q. Now, what type of traffic would you say is
on Pennsylvania Avenue?

A. I would say the majority of your travel on
Pennsylvania Avenue is people going to and
from the Marquardt Plant.

* * *

II

A. I think tl1'tt, I have never made a study of it. I
I think that is where most of them are going.

MR. FULLER:

!

We move the testimony be stricken. With no .
study, it is simply a supposition, your Honor. ,
(Tr. 93-94) I

* * *

Q. Have you ever studied the State Highway
Commission's statistics in that area?
A. I have not.
Q. Do you know, or have an opinion as to what
volume of traffic flow is there?
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MR. BROWN:

I object to this, your Honor.

THE COURT:

He may ask.

Q. Do you know, or do you have an opinion as

to what volume of traffic flow would encourage an oil company to. set up a station on
this street if its location were proper?

A. I can't answer that because I don't have the
information.
Q. I take it then that you do not know either
in terms of volume or flow or actual destinanation what the real destination or source of
traffic on Pennsylvania Avenue is?
A. That is right.

(Tr. 99)

* * *

'

Q. Do you have an opinion, then, as to what type
of service station, to what extent this could
be developed as a service station site?

MR. FULLER:

We raise our objection, no foundation at all.

THE COURT:

Answer the question, whether you do or do
not have an opinion as to whether or not
that would be a desirable service station or
not?

A. I will give my personal opinion. I do 1J0t have

the background M a proper development
man to tell you, that, to tell whether it woul~
or not. I will give my personal opinion. Thats
all I can give. (emphasis added) .
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MR. FULLER:

Now we would object to that.

A. That's all I can do.

Q. I think there is a foundation as much as l\Ir.
Welch's foundation to give his personal •
opinion.

THE COURT:

Don't argue at this time .You can argue later.
The Court will rule that this is legal evidence, you can give whatever value you see
fit. Answer the question.
(Tr. 95)

* * *

MR. FULLER:

And, I take it you are not too familiar with
the prices that are paid for sites for service
stations by your company?

A. No, I am not.

(Tr. 96)

* * *

Q. Now, what type of a service station site would
you have to have, do you think, in your opin·
ion, to pay $35,000.00 for it?

MR. FULLER:

We object, the witness just isn't qualified.

THE COURT:

Answer the question if you can.

A. I can't answer that. I don't know what kind
of property you have to have.
Q. Could you estimate?

A. It is not in my realm of knowledge of the
service station business or where they develop
the property.
(Tr. 102)
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It is respectfully submitted that to permit a witness
to testify as to whether a given property is or is not a
good service station site, over objections timely made,
where a witness ( l) was unfamiliar with the subject
property and ( 2) by his own admissions was not qualified to give such an OP.inion, constituted an abuse of
discretion under the circumstances.

IV.
THE REFERENCE MADE BY PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT TO THE JURORS AS TAXPAYERS
WHO WOULD BEAR THE BURDEN OF THE
VERDICT WAS AN APPEAL TO THE SELFINTEREST OF THE JURORS CONSTITUTlNG PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL.
During the course of his closing argument, counsel
for the State Road Commission made reference to payment of the verdict from public funds and to the jurors
as taxpayers. The exact words of counsel are found
in the transcript (Tr. 182):
"Now, everyone agrees that the Marriott
family is entitled to receive just compensation
for this property being acquired by the State
Road Commission. On the other hand, it would
be unjust to award a windfall at the expense
of the public purse. You people are tax :g~yers,
all of us in this courtroom are tax payers.
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Counsel for the defendant landowners, not wanting
to call undue attention to the improper reference, made
immediate objection by handing the judge a note whicli
appears in the record with the defendants' proposed
Instruction ( R. 42). That note reads as follows:
"Judge Wahlquist:
We take exception to the argument relating
to reference to the "public purse" and "you taxpayers must pay for this;" etc.

"We believe it to be reversible error, unless a
clear admonition is given to the jury on the mat·
ter ."
(Initialed) G.E.F.
The admonition sought by defendants' counsel was
not given by the district judge. Neither at the conclu·
sion of the plaintiff's closing argument (Tr. 187) nor
at the conclusion of all argument (Tr. 190) were the
jurors admonished to disregard their self-interest as
taxpayers. The only subsequent reference to the jurors
as taxpayers was made by defendants' counsel during
his closing argument when he attempted to repair the
damage done by plaintiff's counsel (Tr. 189).
After the jury had retired the district judge quoted
for the record the written objection of counsel for the
landowners (Tr. 190). Formal exception to the remarks
of counsel for the State Road Commission were then
made of record (Tr. 192).
The authorities are unanimously in agreement that
appeals to sympathy, passion and prejudice should
not be allowed. Appeals to class prejudices such as
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appeals to the self interest of jurors as taxpayers are
highly improper and are not to be condoned. Statements in argument that any verdict recovered against
a governmental unit must be satisfied from tax funds
and thus indirectly paid by the jurors and other taxpayers, have uniformly been regarded as highly improper appeals to the self-interest of the jurors. Eager
v. Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314, 410 P. 2d 1003 (1966);
Sullivan v. County of Allegheny, 187 Pa. Super. 370,
144 A. 2d 498 (1958); Mississippi State Highway
Cornmission v. Hall, 252 Miss. 863, 174 So. 2d 488
(1965); 53 Am. Jur., Trial, Sec. 499; Annotation, 33
A. L. R. 2d 442 (1954).
This Court noted in the case of Eager v. Willis,
supra, its agreement with the well-established rule that
appeals to sympathy, passion and prejudice should not
be condoned. On page 1007 of the regional reporter
this Court said:
"
We have no disagreement with the
authorities cited to the effect that pleas plainly
designed to elicit sympathy or to inspire passion
or prejudice should not be allowed ... "
The reasoning behind the rule as it applies to
appeals to the self-interest of jurors as taxpayers is
well-stated in Williams v. City of Anniston, 257 Ala.
191, .58 So. 2d 115 ( 1952). In that case the plaintiff
sought to recover against a municipal corporation for
damages alleged to have been suffered by her from
a fall over a defect in a city sidewalk. The attorney
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for the defendant municipal corporation made a statement to the jury which appears on page 116 and whicli
reads in part :
"If the plaintiff is given a verdict, where will
the money come from 1 It will come out of tliP
city treasury. The city has no money of its mm
The only money which it has is money which ii
gets from taxes . . "

In commenting upon the above-quoted statement
the Supreme Court of Alabama said on page lHi:
"In effect counsel for the defendant told the
members of the jury that if they gave the plain·
tiff a verdict, they were taking the money out
of their own pockets. It was in effect the same
as saying that it would be they themselves together with other taxpayers who would pay the
plaintiff if she was given a verdict. 'Ve think
it clearly appears that the argument of counsel
was ,,an appeal to the prejudices of the jurors
This same condemnatory language applies equally
well to the facts here involved. Counsel for the State
Road Commission informed the jurors that the money
to pay their verdict must come from the "public purse".
The jurors were then expressly, and more directly thau
in the Williams case, reminded that they were all tax·
payers.
This prohibition against argument designed to
elicit sympathy and inspire prejudice is applicable to
both sides in eminent domain cases; the prohibition
acts as a two-edged sword. Such is obvious from the
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case of 1l1is~issippi, Highway Commission v. Deavours,
251 Miss. 552, 170 So. 2d 639 ( 1965), where a reversal
was obtained on the grounds that testimony was admitted, over objection, as to the federal government's
participtaion in road projects for which land was condemned and as to the appraiser for the highway commission being a treaspasser for having failed to secure
permission before entering upon the land to be condemned.
This Court has previously held that argument
which tends to incite sympathy or arouse prejudice by
inviting the jury to resolve any doubt it might have
in favor of one party constitutes a ground for reversal.
In the case of Anderson v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co ..
107 Utah 20, 151 P. 2d 465 (1944), such error was
considered as ground for revarsal. In the concurring
opinion of three justices, the argument by counsel. to
the jury to the effect that the bus company was a foreign
corporation, that it would pay an.y judgment rendered,
and that its property within the state could be levied
upon in satisfaction of the judgment was irrelevant,
improper and constituted a ground for reversal.
Likewise, the Court in the case of Willia1ns v. City
of A rl!niston, supra, thought the argument of counsel,
making reference to the jurors as taxpayers who would
bear the burden of their own verdict, was of such a
prejudicial nature as to constitute a ground for reversal. The prejudicial statement of counsel in that case
has previously been quoted and compared to the words
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of counsel here questioned. In g1vmg its sole grour1r]
for reversal the Alabama Supreme Court held on pagt
116:

"\Ve have carefully considered the argumenl
which counsel for the defendant was allowed to
make in the defendant's behalf to the jury. Thest
statements are obviously an appeal to the self.
interest of the jurors as taxpayers and are ol
such a prejudicial nature as to constitute a
ground for reversal. (citing authority)."
In the case of West v. State, 150 S. W. 2d 363,
366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), the court thought the argu·
ment of counsel to be so highly prejudicial that a rever·
sal would be required, even in the absence of objection.
That case involved the laws of eminent domain and
four improper statements from counsel. The first two
were made in opening argument with no objection,
and the last two were made in closing argument when
objection had been overruled. No admonition or specific
instruction was given by the judge to the jury.

"Counsel's argument to the jury (1) "Youare[
the taxpayers"; ( 2) "The taxpayers will har.e
to pay the bill"; ( 3) "You as taxpayers are d1·
rectly interested in this suit"; ( 4) "'Vhen you go·
above $25 per acre you ":!11 be tak~ng th~ money i
out of your own pockets are plamly direct ap·:
peals to the self-interest and prejudice of the'
jurors. Such arguments have many times been
held to constitute reversible error . . . "
In Doty v. Jacksonville, 106 Fla. 1, 142 So. 599,
601 ( 1932), a condemnation proceeding, counsel for
the city in his argument was permitted, over objection,
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" ... to state to the jury that when they retired to consider their verdict they should keep
in mind that whatever is paid to defendant as
compensation for the pro_perty would come out
of the pocket of the tax payers, and that the
jury as tax payers would pay a part of whatever
should be allowed to the defendant for his property."
Objection to this line of argument was made,
and the objection overruled. This constituted .reversible error. Counsel for the city mad~ some
subsequent effort to qualify and explain this
argument, but the damage had been done, and
we are clearly of the opinion that such argument
was improper, and, in its tendency, prejudicial
to the defendants' case. (citing authority)"
The last two cited cases have held respectively that
prejudicial error resulted even in the absence of an
objection and that'subsequent qualifications and explanations by offending counsel were insufficient to eradicate the error. All cases have not followed such strict
rules. In fact, most cases would appear to follow the
rule that prejudicial error results from an unprovoked
argument of counsel, directing the jurors' attention
, to the fact that any judgment recovered in the action
will be paid from tax funds, when such argument is
not effectively corrected at the trial. Stewart v. Idaho
Falls, 61 Idaho 471, 103 P. 2d 697 (1940); Huggins
V. Hanrnibal, 280 S. W. 74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926); Annotation, 33 A. L. R. 2d 442 (1954).

1

In the instant case, counsel for the defendants
made a timely and strenuous objection. Such objection

was made by the means counsel thought most apprr,
priate to prevent the arousal of further prejudice in tlii
jury by emphasizing and belaboring their status a~
taxpayers. Counsel's objection specifically asked tilt
trial judge to admonish the jury on the matter in order
to prevent reversible error. Still, the judge uttered nor
one word of admonition to the jury concerning their
status as taxpayers and their interest in the law~ur'
arising out of such status (Tr. 190).
In the words of the Court in the Huggins case at
page 75,

" . . . ( t) he only proper remedy, if any, m
such a situation is for the court, upon objectiou
being made, "to promptly and eff ectiYely rebuke
counsel so as to strongly impress the jury witlr
the unfairnes of the procedure, and to deter them
from giving the least 'veight to an argument so
hostile to the pure administration of justice,
(citing authority)".
The test to be a pp lied in determining whether a
fair and impartial trial was had or whether prejudice
resulted from the argument of counsel has been stated
in varying ways. In Williams v. City of AnniYto11,
supra, the Alabama Supreme Court said on page 117:
"The point is advanced that the argument
should not be regarded as prejudicial beca~se
there was ample evidence to support the yerd1cl
by the jury regardless of the argument .. The
test however is not that the arirument did un·
·It1
lawfullv influence the wrdict, but that it n11g
have d~ne so (citing authority)".
'

'

u
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This Court has stated the test somewhat differently
in the case of Eager v. Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314, 410 P.
2d 1003, 1005 ( 1966). In that case this Court saw no
transgression of principles previously stated by counsel
for defendant having asked the jurors to consider tpem~
selves in the situation of the plaintiff.
"The question here involved is whether the
case was presented to the jury in such a manner
that it is reasonable to believe that the parties
had an opportunity to present their evidence
and have a fair and impartial trial by the Court
and jury. If that result has been accomplished
irregularities or minor errors should be disregarded. Reversal of a judgment is justified only
when there is some error of such a substantial
nature that there is a likelihood that the result
would have been different in its absence."
It is respectfully submitted that there is a likelihood
that the result would have been different in the absence
of statements to which objection is here made. This is
strongly pointed out by a comparison of the evidence
with the jury verdict. Testimony in this case was highly
conflicting. The State's appraiser gave a figure o'f
$7,500.00 as the value of 0.83 acre of land (Tr. 123),
while the landowners' appraiser testified to a value. of
$35,000.00 (Tr. 73). The jury verdict did not vary one
cent from the figure testified to by the State's appraiser.
In a case where the testimony was so highly conflicting,
the jury verdict clearly shows the influence of prejudice.
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v.
PR EJ U DIC I AL AND ERRONEOU
STATEl\1ENTS OF LA "\V CONTAINED I:i
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS DEPRIVED DE
FENDANT LANDO"\VNERS OF A FAIR AXD
IMPARTIAL TRIAL.

No jury instructions were given which effecfoel!
corrected the error committed by counsel in referrin~
to the jurors as taxpayers with the burden of satisfyini
their own verdict. In fact, the jury instructions gim
by the trial judge compounded the error which 1rn
subsequently committed by counsel for the State Roarl
Commission. The trial judge even stated for the recora
that the instructions gave emphasis to the law again~i
sympathy and prejudice in favor of the landowners
Defendants took exception to several of the Instructiolli
given by the Court to the jury, claiming generally th:il
the instructions supported the position taken by counsel
for plaintiff in his closing argument wherein he referre1l
to the "public purse" and that the jurors are "taxpay- g1v
ers", and also objected to the instructions as bein~.
definitely slanted and adverse against the propert) '.
owners due to repetition and emphasis contained there·
in (Tr. 191-193).
The Instructions to which exceptions were taken.
insofar as material to this argument, are as follows: :

stn
"No. 8.
'~d· n
31
h
" ... If, in your deliberation, you .bel!eve t of 1
the evidence introduced by both parties 1s even!)
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balanced and the evidence of one party .is no
more believable than the evidence of the other
then you will reject the contentions advanced'
by the defendant land owner." (emphasis added)
(R. 159)
"No. 9.
" ... Specifically, if the defendant landowners fail to prove the truthfulness of the facts
which they allege by a preponderance of the evidence, you will find against the defendant landowners in your deliberation of such fact." (emphasis added)
(R. 160 )

st

'S,

al
el

"No. 15.
"You are instructed that feelings and expressions of sympathy and generosity toward the
landowners have no place in the trial of this
matter. Nor should such feelings or expressions
be present in your deliberations or play any part
therein, nor shall you assess any damages or ·
compensation for any such feelings or expressions . . . ,,
(R. 166)

After exceptions were taken to the Instructions as
y· given, the Court stated:

:11

~n.

" ... There is somewhat more emphasis than
I realized in the instructions going against sympathy and prejudice and this type of thing, but
I do not believe it will prejudice this jury. I
(Tr. 193)
will leave it stand."

The trial judge was ref erring specifically to Instruction No. 15 ( R. 43 & Tr. 166) . That instruction
admonishes the jury against "feelings and expressions
~1
"
1Jr of sympathy and generosity toward the landowners
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(emphasis added). There is no corresponding instrut
tion making reference to feeling and expressions n:
sympathy and generosity toward the State. Such an
instruction admonishing in regard to prejudice again.1;
the landowner and for the State was clearly necessar1
to balance the instructions, particularly in light of th1
unfortunate statements made by plaintiff's counse1
during his closing argument. Furthermore, Instructio11
No. 15 is repetitive of the exact principle by again mak
ing reference to sympathy for the landowners, thu1
giving undue prominence to such admonition.
The giving of instructions which are unbalancea
in favor of one party and which give undue prominence
to legal principles favorable to either side is contrary
to sound judicial practice and constitutes reversible
error. This Court specifically held that unbalancea
instructions which influenced the jury in bringing it~
verdict of no cause of action constituted reversible error.
Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P. 2d 1073 (1955).
Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court has held as fol·
lows in Evans v. Holsinger, 242 Iowa 870, 48 N. ""
2d 250, 255 ( 1951) :
" ... It is well established that undue prorni·
nence should not be given, in the court's instruc·
tions, to any matter favorable to either side; ano
that correct statements of the law if repeatea
to the point of such undue emphasis, may con·
stitute reversible error."

In Instruction No. 8 (R. 43 & Tr. 159) and again
in Instruction No. 9 (R. 43 & Tr. 160) the jury t)
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fendant landowners. Such repetition of a burden of
proof instruction to the point of undue emphasis has
been held upon appeal to constitute reversible error.
Boruchi v. McLaughlin, 344 Ill. App. 550, 101 N. E.
2d 624 (1951); O'Gallagher v. Finkel, 7 Ill. App. 2d
296, 129 N. E. 2d 345 (1955); Evans v. Holsinger,
supra. This Court held in the case of Shields v. Utah
Light & Traction Co., 99 Utah 307, 105 P. 2d 347, 349,
351 ( 1940) , that reversible error resulted from emphasis
by reiteration.
" . . . The reiteration of given propositions'
to the jury in the instructions does not have judicial approval. (citing authority)"

* * *

" . . . And the resulting emphasis on applicable laws favorable to plaintiff's side as a result
of the continual reference and repeating of certain law propositons resulted in the unbalancing
of the charge, and error."

Specific objection is here made to the last sentence
of Instruction No. 8 and the last sentence of the first
paragraph of Instruction No. 9. The first of these two
1
rni· sentences, from Instruction No. 8, is here reproduced:

""

rue·

ano
1tea

on·

ain

"If, in your deliberation, you believe that the
evidence introduced by both parties is evenly
balanced and the evidence of one party is no
more believable than the evidence of the other,
then you will reject the contentions advanced
by the defendant landowner." (emphasis added)
(R. 43 & Tr. 159)
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This sentence and also the sentence to which reference has been made in Instruction No. 9, announce a
proposition which cannot be supported by law. Thest
sentences announce to the jury an "all or nothing
proposition which has no place in a condemnation case.
These sentences directly advise the jurors to "rejeti
(all) the contentions advanced by the defendant landowners" in the event the evidence is evenly balanced.
This is simply a matter of instructing the jury to fina
in a sum equal to that testified to by the State Roacl
Commission should the evidence be equally balanced.
This is nothing short of a directed verdict in many condemnation cases such as the one at bar.
A similar instruction was assigned as error in tlie
condemnation case of State of Idaho ex. rel. Rich t'.
Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 95, 286 P.2d 1112, 1117
( 1955). Instruction No. 15 in that case reads as fol·
lows:
"You are instructed that the burden of proof
as to the value of the land taken and the dam·
ages which result to the property not taken i~
upon the defendants in this case. If in your
opinion, the defendants have not carried the bur·
den of proof in establishing value and damages
in this case your verdict shall not be in excesi
of the amonnt established by the State of Idnho
as values and damages." (emphasis added)
In reviewing the case because of the error contained
in Instruction No. 15, the Idaho Supreme Court said:
"The instruction as given assumed a fact to
exist which is not evidence, namely, that respond·
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ent had established by some method or means
the value of the land taken and amount of the
damages to the remainder.
"It is the province of the jury to evaluate the
pertinent testimony of all the witnesses and fix
the value of the land· taken and the damage to
the remainder because of the severance from the
whole. The instructions as given limited the
amount of the recovery to an undetermined,
assumed, established sum. The burden of proving the amount of damages sustained, i.e., the
value of the land taken and resultant damage
to the remainder, must be borne by appellants.
VVhether such burden has been sustained is a
question for the jury to determine. The second

sentence of said instruction above quoted should
not have been given." (emphasis added)

This Court has specifically held that errors and
irregularities in jury instructions, such as those here
[. presented, constitute reversible error. The personal
injury case of Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d
1f
134, 279 P. 2d I 073, 1077 ( 1955) , so holds:

d

I:
0

j.

"Even assuming that the instructions of the
court taken in their entirety could be considered
correct as given, the continual repetition of instructions on contributory negligence and the
positive delineation of the duties of the plaintiffs, as contrasted with the qualified negative
statements of the duties of the defendants, unbalanced the instructions in favor of the defendants and influenced the jury in bringing its
verdict of no cause of action as against all three
plaintiffs, and the ref ore constituted reversible
error."
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CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion should amply justify,
holding that these defendants did not have a fair a11J
impartial trial; in short, that they did not have ·'their
day in court". Applying the general rule that situation,
of this type should be measured by the standard nl
whether there was a reasonable possibility that the jur)
was influenced by the claimed prejudicial errors com·
mitted, it would be well to again refer to the statemenl
of the trial judge (Tr. 193) when he stated:
" ... There is somewhat more emphasis thau
I realized in the instructions going against sym·
pathy and prejudice and this type of thing, bu!
I do not believe it will prejudice this jury."
Obviously, the trial judge did not expect the verdid
to be returned on the basis of the lowest testimoni
given, since the remark can only be interpreted as a
belief that the verdict would be higher. Stated cou·
versely, the comment implies that the effect of prejudice
would be present in a verdict exactly amounting to ibe
lowest testimony furnished.
It is respectfully submitted that justice can uni)",
be served in this case by reversing and remanding the,
matter for a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER and
ORVAL C. HARRISON
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellanb
15 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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